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The Influence of Business on the Choice of Development Strategy in “Lula’s” Brazil​[1]​

It is a widely shared view amongst Latin America specialists that in the 1980s and 1990s the region entered a period dominated by a neo-liberal development agenda in a context of severe external constraints from mounting foreign debts and the intrusive behaviour of such international financial institutions as the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank that sought to impose a neo-liberal agenda through its conditional loans to the governments in the region. The neo-liberal agenda of economic openness, privatization of state companies and strict fiscal policies came was pushed on the Latin American governments as a way for them to pursue structural adjustment to the challenges of high, largely external, indebtedness.

As a consequence, the region experienced what Barbara Stallings (1992) has called a sea change in development strategies. A rather generalized adoption of neo-liberal prescriptions thus characterized Latin American development strategies from the mid 1980s, although some countries such as Brazil were slower at adopting this new trend. Brazil’s “tardiness” made defenders of the neo-liberal agenda describe Brazil as the “laggard” of Latin America. The slowness with which Brazil adopted the neo-liberal agenda can without doubt be explained by its in international comparisons high rate of economic growth under a different kind of economic development strategy characterized by import-substitution and industrialization. Following such a strategy, Brazil achieved an average yearly economic growth rate of 8.6 % between 1970 and 1980 at the same time that the share of industrial output in the overall GDP was growing (Pedersen, 2008: 43), and Brazil stands as the most successful among developing countries in terms of its economic growth in the 20’th century until the 1970s (Abreu, 2002: 15). 

This neo-liberal sea change, however, has come under pressure in Latin America during the last few years due to the poor performance of neo-liberal reform strategies in many Latin American countries. Argentina, for instance, experienced a severe financial and development crisis around 2001-2002, and Venezuela saw its GDP per capita fall drastically between 1978 and 1998 when Hugo Chávez came to power on an agenda of revolutionary change. As a result of the poor performance of many neo-liberal reform countries, new democratically elected governments on the left or centre-left have taken over in a large number of Latin American countries. Jorge Lanzaro (2009) characterizes this as a new and, in historical perspective, significant political development. The move to the left has also been associated with the emergence of a wide array of social movements, NGOs and other social actors that have raised different agendas from vibrant civil societies. Probably the most noted tendency within this emergence of new social groups has been the growing presence of indigenous movements pressing for greater inclusion for indigenous people in countries such as in Bolivia and Ecuador. Organized civil society has often greatly impacted on development agendas in different countries, but the nature of these agendas and of the new left-wing governments is a highly contested issue. Analysts are divided about how to characterized the different new left-wing governments and even disagree on which governments belong to the category of left-wing or centre-left governments.

There is a relatively broad consensus amongst analysts, though, that the new turn to the left is by no means uniform in nature. They tend to divide the new left-wing governments into two main groups. One group is characterized as pragmatic and realistic (Castañeda, 2006), social democratic (Lanzaro, 2009) or neo-liberal (Petras, 2006; Palma, 2008) and right-wing not left-wing (Petras, 2006). Governments in this group correspond to a political left that has gone through an ideological transition since the 1970s. They have accepted many ideas from the neo-liberal camp leaving behind more critical positions (Palma, 2008). In spite of these different characterizations and differences in views of the relative merit of this sub-group of new left governments in Latin America, the analysts all agree that Lula’s PT government in Brazil, Bachelet’s Socialist Concertación government in Chile and Vazquez’ Frente Amplio government in Uruguay belong in this sub-group. Similarly, the authors all place Morales’ MAS government in Bolivia and Chavez’ government in Venezuela in the category of populist governments. 

The distinction between these two categories of left, centre-left (or right-wing) corresponds to the perceived closeness or distance of the governments to the neo-liberal development agenda as well as to the perceived degree of diplomatic closeness (cooperation) or distance (conflict) from the US government and reaction to US hegemony. The analysts differ as to their likes or dislikes of the two types of new left. Palma and Petras find that the neo-liberal “left” stand for continuation of neo-liberal strategies that are basically in the interest of economic elites and not in the interest of more typical left-wing constituencies. Castañeda, on the other hand, find that the new and more pragmatic left is likely to achieve development success and a reduction of poverty as well as a strengthening of democratic governance, while the populist left will not have success. Instead he fears that a more authoritarian type of government may develop and expects populist policies to hurt the poor in the long term. Marco Aurélio García has offered an argument that somewhat transcends this relatively dualistic discussion. In his view (García, 2008), the differences in policies discussed above can largely be explained by the different trajectories and economic structures of the Andes countries vis-a-vis the countries of the Southern Cone. Whereas the economies of the Andes countries are characterized as primary-export led economies, the Southern Cone has developed a higher degree of industrialization. Taken together with the political trajectories of the Andes countries and the Southern Cone countries, these differences help explain the different orientations in the two regions. The merit of García’s analysis is that it seeks to explain different orientations on the basis of the past development trajectories of the countries and on the basis of the different situations and challenges that they face at the present time.

In this study, I analyze Brazil’s development strategy under the Lula government from a perspective that, like Marco Aurelio García’s perspective, seeks to understand empirically observed tendencies on the basis of the historical background and the situation and challenges faced by the Lula government. The study is inspired by the literature on “developmental states”, that is developing countries which achieve some degree of success in terms of “catching-up” with the more developed countries, and particularly by the contributions to this debate by Peter Evans (1995) and Linda Weiss (1998). The argument of these theorists is that, contrary to the market-oriented view that sees free unregulated markets as the best way to development, successful development in developing countries is best achieved through collaborative relations between the business sector and the state.

On the basis of these views and perspectives, the question addressed in the analysis is: How does the collaboration between the business sector and the Brazilian state function, and how are the views of business (as well as wider societal views) represented in the development strategy of the Lula government?

The analysis looks at the macro-economic aspect, the issue of industrial policies and internationally oriented aspects of the development strategy.

The argument defended is that the development strategy of the Lula government should not mainly be understood as a strategy of neo-liberal continuity. The Lula government has pursued a strategy that is significantly different from the neo-liberal governments before it, although this does not mean a return to the Import Substitution Industrialization strategy. The strategy, though liberal in orientation, has placed great emphasis on the positive contribution that an active and strategically oriented state can give in the search for national development. In doing so, the Brazilian government has sought to engage the business sector and the wider society through institutionalized channels with the aim of developing an appropriate development strategy, i.e. a strategy that ensures sustainable and more widely shared economic growth as well as legitimacy in the population. 

After these introductory discussions, I now turn to a brief theoretical section on state-business relations from the “developmental state” literature. The theoretical section is followed by a short presentation of state-business/state-society relations in Brazil prior to Lula’s government and then continues with the analysis of the Lula period, and, finally, the conclusion sums up the main findings. 


THEORY
In his influential book on developmental states, Peter Evans (1995: 3) argued: “Without the state, markets, the other master institution of modern society, cannot function”. One can hardly argue against this formulation, since even market-oriented liberal development strategies must be implemented by the state just as in the case of development strategies with a more active state involvement. As Peter Evans (1995: 10) formulates this: “State involvement is a given. The appropriate question is not “how much” but “what kind”.

Robert Devlin and Graciela Moguillansky (2009: 100) distinguish between two different types of national development strategies with quite different approaches to the question of what kind of state involvement is more appropriate when governments seek to foster national economic development. In the first type, the state emphasizes the autonomous functioning of market forces and focuses its policies on monetary and fiscal policies compatible with macroeconomic stability, protection of property rights, economic openness and investments in certain public goods such as education and infrastructure, hoping that the free functioning of the market mechanism will be sufficient to produce economic development. In the second type, in contrast, the state seeks more actively to promote new comparative advantages instead of accepting existing comparative advantages. The goal in this strategy is to promote productive transformation and it has often been used by developing countries desirous of catching-up with the more industrially developed countries. Devlin and Moguillansky (2009: 99) argue that the developing countries that have experienced success with catching-up strategies, mostly Asian countries, all have had one thing in common, namely: 
“la actitud proactiva del gobierno, que fomentó el desarrollo 
mediante la implementación eficaz de una estrategia nacional 
de transformación productiva a mediano y largo plazos, orientada 
a la inserción nacional. Dicha estrategia se organizó en el marco 
de una alianza pública-privada”

Peter Evans argues that variations in state structure and in state-society relations are of great significance for development outcomes. In making this point he constructs (Evans, 1995: 12) “two historically grounded ideal-types: predatory and developmental states”. In predatory states, there is a lack of an efficient “Weberian” bureaucracy. Instead, ties between rulers and elites are based on personal ties. Obviously, this opens up for corruption and for policies that are not developed with a view of the national interest. In developmental states this is different. The bureaucracy comes close to a “Weberian” bureaucracy and: “Corporate coherence gives these apparatuses a certain kind of “autonomy.” They are not, however, insulated from society as Weber suggested they should be. To the contrary, they are embedded in a concrete set of social ties that binds the state to society and provides institutionalized channels for the continual negotiation of goals and policies.” (Evans, 1995: 12). Peter Evans’ focus on state-society relations emphasizes the relationship between government and economic elites, although he does argue (1995: 17) that for instance the European social democratic case of Austria is an example of how a more broadly defined embeddedness “may offer a more robust basis for transformation in the long run.” In any case, Evans’ argument about developmental states is that they need to be characterized both by embeddedness and autonomy (Evans, 1995: 12). For some authors, an authoritarian regime form is part of the definition of a developmental state. However, I do not see why democratic regimes could not qualify. Brazil, prior to the military coup in 1964 seems to be a good example of a democratic developmental state.

Jørgen Dige Pedersen has pointed out (2008: 31) that the developmental state literature has largely neglected international activities of developmental states in its emphasis on the domestic relationship between state and society (particularly business). However, as Pedersen argues: “In principle, all states have the ability to promote economic transformation through a wide variety of internationally oriented activities…” He stresses their potential for shaping the rules of international economic relations through diplomatic efforts and at promoting exports or the internationalization of private national companies. 

It is true that even developing countries could potentially influence international trade rules. However, this capacity is probably more likely amongst relatively powerful developing countries than small underdeveloped countries. A similar argument could be made about the chances of development success for different developing countries. As Pedersen argues (2008: 33) economic outcomes of state activities must be measured in the light of existing structural possibilities and limitations. In the same vein, Linda Weiss has argued (1998) that the strength of the private sector is also an important variable in achieving successful development outcomes. In explaining why he chose to focus on Brazil, India and Korea, Evans, similarly, argues (1995: 11) that: “NICs are particularly good cases because they are less thoroughly constrained than peripheral raw materials exporters and more desperate to achieve transformation than advanced industrial countries.” In other words, the productive structures of intermediately developed countries, provides them with better opportunities to achieve productive transformation that could help them in their strife for national economic development and in catching up with the more highly developed industrial countries. These arguments all point towards the point made by Devlin and Moguillansky (2009: 98) that development outcomes in the successful Asian cases must be understood on the basis of both internal and external factors linked to the particular situation of each one of them. Successful development strategies therefore must also take their point of exit in the concrete situations in which different countries find themselves. 

The key idea developed in this theoretical discussion, however, is that active state planning of development in collaboration with business (embeddedness) may be a good strategy for a developing country that seeks to pursue industrial or productive transformation in an aim to reach a higher level of development and citizen welfare. Factors that enable or constrain this aim should be taken into account when analyzing strategies and development outcomes. Success also depends on the character that collaboration between state and business, and on the structure of the state and its ability “to act in a coherent, capable and relatively autonomous way” (Pedersen, 2008: 28 on Peter Evans’ theoretical position).  


STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS IN BRAZIL’s DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Brazil’s import-substitution and industrialization strategy (ISI) was developed as a reaction to the experience of the Great Depression and the economic recession it provoked in Brazil. Prior to this, Brazil had pursued a more liberal strategy that was largely in the interest of rural economic elites and trading businesses. The stronghold of industrial development then as now was São Paulo, and in 1928 São Paulo industrialists formed the strongest business association in the country, namely the Centro das Indústrias do Estado de São Paulo, CIESP (Pedersen, 2008: 140). As a reaction to the economic crisis in the early 1930s a corporatist state structure with close ties between state and business was developed during Getúlio Vargas’ presidency. Industrial interest organizations were set-up in sector-specific organizations, every Brazilian state got its own overarching state-level industrial federation and a nation-wide confederation was formed in 1933 on the basis of an already existing organization. The most important of these federations was São Paulo’s state federation FIESP that was created out of the existing CIESP, although CIESP was also maintained (Pedersen, 2008: 140-141). The import-substitution and industrialization strategy was maintained basically until 1990 (Lima and Hirst, 2006) and was quite favourable of industrial sector interests. Pedersen analyzes the developments in and characteristics of the relationship between state and industry in this period and shows nuances in the relationship but a general tendency of pro-business policies, sometimes pursued in a strongly state directed manner and at other times with closer consultation of industry. During the dictatorship (1964-85) pro-business policies were coupled with the repression of labour (Pedersen, 2008: 142-146) bringing Brazil close to the authoritarian Asian developmental state. Arguably, the similarity in the politics of authoritarian Brazil and Asian authoritarian developmental states is quite strong. However, Evans (1995: 60-66) argues that Brazil was somewhere in between a developmental state and a predatory state due to the fragmented character of the state and the tendency towards informal relationships between bureaucrats and private business interests. It should be noted, though, that this did not prevent Brazil in achieving an exceptionally successful economic development trajectory until the late 1970s. Another difference noted in comparisons between Latin America and Asian approaches to ISI is that the successful Asian countries pursued strategies that included performance criteria in terms of industry’s ability to compete in international markets after an initial period where they were more protected. Brazil comes out relatively favourably in comparison to most other Latin American economies, it could be argued, as a consequence of its strategy in the 1960s and 1970s of “attracting foreign direct capital using fiscal rebates linked to future export performance” (Abreu, 2002: 17). However, the protectionist approach was maintained and Brazil’s export performance was insufficient in the sense that the country as the rest of Latin America was hit hard by a balance-of-payments crisis in 1980 that eventually led to the adoption of a liberal strategy from 1990 (Lima and Hirst, 2006).

The period 1990 to 2002 was a period in which the focus on economic stabilization achieved through economic liberalization and privatization was at the centre of Brazil’s development strategy. Pedersen (2008: 152) notes that there was a tendency during the Cardoso governments (1995-2002) to pursue more autonomous policies and partially closing the channels for business influence on government policy. The perceived lack of influence on the part of business led the two leading industrial interest organizations FIESP and CNI​[2]​ (Confederação National da Industria) to arrange a ‘March to Brasília” in order to voice their dissatisfaction (ibid: 150). The organizations were dissatisfied with a development strategy that they believed was overly influenced by a neo-liberal or monetarist agenda and had too little emphasis on active state involvement in planning development and carrying out development oriented actions in relation to a more deliberate development strategy than the relatively passive liberalization strategy. Abreu (2002: 18) argues that there was a widespread reluctance in the business sector to engage in further liberalization and that this reluctance was particularly noteworthy in the context of negotiations about the US-proposed Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA). José Augusto Guilhon Albuquerque (1998: 6) points to a survey that showed that Brazilian elites viewed the interests of the U.S. and Brazil as basically incompatible and argues that this scepticism (ibid: 3-5) was shared by President Cardoso and the government. Business dissatisfaction with the government’s development agenda led FIESP and CNI to restructure their organizations with an emphasis on the strengthening of their own analytical capabilities. Also, they sought to gain more direct access to interacting with the political system. Pedersen (2008: 151) argues that particularly the CNI strengthened its role as an articulator of Brazilian business interests. CNI furthermore organized the Brazilian Business Coalition from 1996 that has sought to create a common position of industry towards international trade negotiations. In other words, business was becoming an increasingly well-organized and well-articulated player in the state-business relationship prior to the Lula government. 

At the same time, as stabilization continued being an elusive goal throughout the 1990-2002 period, the commitment to the liberal reform policies tended to weaken in the government, particularly in the context of Argentina’s economic crisis in 2001-2002. According to Abreu, speaking of the presidential campaign in 2002 (2002: 19): “All candidates during the recent presidential campaign emphasized how desirable was a return of more interventionist “industrial” policies.”  Jawdat Abu-El-Haj (2007: 108-111) argues that the Cardoso government actually moved in a more interventionist direction in 2000. It was in this context that Lula as the candidate of the Workers’ Party (PT) was elected as president in 2002 after having insistently sought to convince the financial markets that his party had left behind ideas of disrespecting the debt of the public sector. Nevertheless, uncertainty in financial markets provoked severe balance-of-payments constraints at the time provoking very high interest rates and a high risk premium on Brazilian bonds as well as driving down the value of the Brazilian currency the Real. In this context, where globalization as a source of development constraints showed its teeth, the new Lula government demonstrated a commitment to very strict stabilization policies and a “fast confidence rebuilding process was triggered and much healthier external accounts led to a fast appreciation of the currency” and “the risk premium of Brazilian bonds over US treasuries plummeted from 14 to 8 percentage points.” (Abreu and Werneck, 2005: 22).

Stabilization and confidence building with the financial markets were thus high on the political agenda of the Lula government from the start. As the Brazilian population and financial markets during the election campaign in 2002 had been uncertain about the position of an eventual PT led government on the issue of its willingness (and ability) to respect financial commitments, Lula sent out a Letter to the Brazilian People in June 2002 (Lula, 2002) in which he stressed that financial commitments would be respected. This clear message and change in the position of the PT towards the debt and foreign debt question thus seems to have helped Lula in gaining the popular support that led to his election as president. As Pedersen (2008: 154) argues Lula had also built close relations to the business community in São Paulo in the period prior to his election. Lula’s electoral base was therefore quite broad.

The fact that the new government pursued very strict fiscal and monetary policies from the outset has led to the view amongst a large number of analysts that Lula’s economic policy was one of continuity with the policies pursued by the Cardoso government. Defending this point Rubens Barbosa (Bacoccina, 2008) argues that it was in the foreign policy area that the Lula government more clearly held on to its old positions and therefore was somewhat different from the Cardoso government and that the aim with this was to give ideological satisfaction to the traditional electoral base of the PT on the political left and make it accept the continuity in economic policy. The argument that I defend in the following analysis is slightly at odds with this view, since I find that the government’s economic policy is different from that of the Cardoso government. The Lula government has given a much more central role to active state involvement in planning economic development and in this context new institutions for state-business dialogue and broader state-society dialogue have been created. In other words, the Lula government has moved in a developmental state direction where it is embedding itself broadly in society through institutionalized dialogue mechanisms. It has, however, also maintained a strong emphasis on stabilization policies that the monetarist or neo-liberal position prescribes. On the foreign policy side, I will also argue that its policy should not just be seen as ideological in an irrational way. Instead, the foreign policy orientation, as the economic policy orientation, has been guided by rational strategic considerations, and the contribution of external relations to economic development has been a strong concern in the formulation and implementation of foreign policy. The development policy can be considered relatively business friendly, but the business community is not in agreement with all aspects of government policy. 

STATE-BUSINESS RELATIONS IN THE LULA GOVERNMENT’S DEVELOPMENT STRATEGY
Towards the end of the Cardoso government, there was criticism within the government of the excessive growth of the public debt as well as the excessive dependence on foreign capital inflows in order to cover the current account deficit. The internal debate led to a new focus on export-led development (Abu-El-Haj, 2007: 108-111). According to Marcelo de Paiva Abreu (2002: 18-19), there was a strong trend in society towards mercantilist ways of thinking and a potentially broad coalition of interests favourable of protectionism. This coalition included domestic entrepreneurs, unions and multinationals.  

Fiesp (2002) and CNI (2002) published documents prior to the presidential elections in 2002 with the motive of presenting their views of how Brazil should move forward in order to assure a more successful economic development. The two organizations had relatively similar views of the problems confronting Brazilian development, the goals that should guide government policy and the means with which the goals should be reached. They both stressed the need to bring the public debt/GDP ratio under control and to reduce external economic vulnerability as a prerequisite for bringing down interest rates and increasing productive investments and thereby assure a new path of economic growth on a sustainable foundation. They both emphasized that growing exports should be a priority as a way to reduce external vulnerability and as part of developing an internationally competitive economy that would create new jobs and economic growth. 

The growth model envisioned should be more equitable and go hand in hand with a reduction of poverty and economic inequality. Both documents argued for renewed state activism in pursuing these goals. Fiesp favoured tax incentives for exports while CNI similarly argued for reducing export constraints. CNI emphasized that national competitiveness was the cornerstone in the strategy that should be pursued and that it should be improved in the context of increased global integration and a growth in technologically advanced exports with high levels of value-adding. Fiesp emphasized that there was a need to develop competitive advantages and that this required coherence between an active industrial policy and the international trade policy. Success further demanded long-term indicative planning on the part of the state and in this effort of planning development a policy of competitive import substitution should be pursued. CNI, on its part, spoke of the need for a new type of activism on the part of the state. 

This activism required broad coordination between different ministries and public institutions and should be paired with public-private coordination. This effort would demand a restructuring of the way the fragmented Brazilian state functioned, the CNI document argued, but it was through a symbiosis of a complex set of policies that required coordinated actions by many agencies that Brazil would be able to achieve growing productive investments, growing exports and the transformation of the production structure in the direction of new products with a high technological content and innovation. With regard to international trade negotiations the two organizations both stressed that it would be important to move forward in economic negotiations with South America. CNI emphazised South America as an important market for Brazilian exports and Fiesp spoke of the need to pursue further economic integration in South America. In this process, both saw Mercosur as a central component and CNI argued that Brazil should renew its efforts towards moving forward Mercosur and at the same time seek a Brazilian leadership role in the arrangement. Apart from this emphasis on South America, CNI argued for a strategy of maximizing the relationship of cost/benefit in negotiations with the EU and with the US in the FTAA (Free Trade Area of the Americas) negotiations. Economic relations with the developing countries outside South America are also mentioned in the two documents but the hierarchy of priorities seems to be South America (with Mercosur at its centre), EU and FTAA, and, finally, the rest of the developing world.

In an empirical study of the views of the ‘Brazilian Foreign Policy Community’​[3]​ with regard to Brazil’s international agenda, these priorities are confirmed. The promotion of foreign trade and reduction of the trade deficit is placed as top priority with 73 % arguing that this is extremely important and 25 % arguing that it is important, followed by guaranteeing democracy in South America, strengthening Mercosur and Brazilian regional leadership. Further down the list we find promotion of the WTO negotiations that 55 % see as extremely important, integration of South American energy and transportation infrastructure (52 %). Only 43 % see the negotiation of free trade agreements with EU and in FTAA as extremely important (Souza, 2002: 42), while the commercial protectionism of the rich countries is ranked as the most critical external threat, with 75 % of respondents arguing that it is a critical threat (Souza, 2002: 39). Despite these views favouring mercantilism and an active state pursuing a long-term development strategy, it is important to stress that 67 % in the ‘Brazilian Foreign Policy Community’ in Amaury de Souza’s report (2002: 30) find the policy of economic openness during the Cardoso government to have been generally good, but that at the same time 82 % find that Brazil ought to have a more aggressive posture in international trade negotiations (Souza, 2002: 28). Interestingly, in a similar report by Souza from 2008, 88 % find that the policy of economic openness has been generally good for the country (Souza, 2008: 6). 

In other words, business support for a more active state with a more aggressive or affirmative approach to defending Brazilian business interests is coupled with a support for economic openness. This shows that the international competitiveness of Brazilian producers has become a consensus position shared by business and government. This is a change from the ISI period where there was a stronger focus on protectionist barriers and the domestic market and less of a focus on competitiveness on foreign markets, although export promotion was also part of the Brazilian ISI strategy.

There are some differences but more similarities between the recommendations of the two leading industrial organizations. What is striking, when comparing with the development strategies of the 1990s, is the strong emphasis that both organizations place on industrial policy, foreign trade policy and the need for an active and strategically oriented state action. The position of both organizations can be described as a modern form of mercantilism emphasizing the central role of the state in promoting the international competitiveness of the national economic system. Souza’s report seems to indicate that this position is in large part a response to Brazil’s external vulnerability and to the wide-spread perception that protectionism and mercantilism also guides the development strategies of the rich countries. 

When analyzing the orientation of the Lula government’s development strategy, both in terms of the official discourse and the policies actually pursued, one finds that many of the views, orientations and priorities of the leading industrial organizations also characterize the Lula government. Jørgen Dige Pedersen (2008: 165) argues, in relation to this issue:

	“The Lula administration has since 2003 demonstrated that a state-
	business alliance can indeed both be strengthened and combined with 
	a situation with labour representatives being politically in charge of
	the state.” 

It is striking how similar the development strategy of the Lula government has been when compared to the documents presented by Fiesp and CNI in 2002. Perhaps this is not all that surprising as the investment decisions or indecisions of the business sector are essential in terms of the ability of the government in a capitalist country to promote economic growth. On the other hand, the example of Venezuela during the presidency of Hugo Chávez shows that a government in a capitalist country may indeed challenge the preferences of the business sector. For Gabriel Palma (2008) the business friendly policy pursued by the Lula government shows that Brazil under Lula has continued pursuing a neo-liberal development strategy basically in favour of the economic elites and that the PT has gone through an ideological transformation. 

In the following section, I show that, although the Lula government has followed a strategy close to that favoured by the leading organizations of the industrial sector embedding the state in the business sector, the government has pursued its strategy with a degree of autonomy and at the same time has sought, with some success, to embed itself more broadly in society. It could be argued that this reflects the ideological social fairness orientation of the PT. Similarly, the strategy of the government has its own imprints that do not reflect business preferences, although it has sought to pursue a policy (broadly) favourable of the interests of business and of the interest of national development.     

In late 2003, the Ministry of Development, Industry and Foreign Trade presented its development strategy in a document entitled PITCE which stands for Industrial, Technological and Foreign Trade Policy in English. It is noteworthy that the very title of the document shows an attempt at proposing a complex and multi-faceted approach to the development of the country as CNI (2002) had called for, and that it combines the issue of industrial development with foreign trade and technological issues. In the document (MDIC, 2003), the government distinguished between the short-term goals and the long-term goals of the development strategy. The main short-term goal of the policy
was to reduce the external economic constraints on Brazil’s development, while the long-term goal was to increase the efficiency and competitiveness of the national economy with the help of technological development and innovation. Another aim was to contribute to regional development and mass consumption in a country with a highly unbalanced regional and social development. Furthermore, the document singled out a small number of technologically advanced sectors as strategic priorities that would be given special treatment in terms of reduced taxes and credit on better conditions from the national development bank, the BNDES. The explicit aim was to improve the competitiveness and to turn around trade deficits in some of the sectors. The document furthermore stresses export growth as a key goal to be pursued as a way to create a stable foundation. The overall orientation was in strong agreement with the positions defended by CNI and Fiesp. Pedersen (2008: 154) points out, that São Paulo businessmen had developed close relations to Lula prior to his election. It seems that the ideas of the leading business organizations were considered closely by the new Lula government. This can also be seen on the institutional front. Thus, the government set up an industrial development council, the CNDI, in 2004, with members from different ministries and other state institutions as well as members from business and unions (mainly from business), and an implementing agency, ABDI (Pedersen, 2008: 154). Reflecting its desire for a broad embeddedness of the state in civil society and a broad societal debate on Brazil’s development strategy, an economic and social development council, the CNDES, was formed already in May 2003. Such institutionalized channels for interaction and dialogue as well as for the development of strategic guidelines for various development initiatives show a willingness of the government to count on broad societal participation and a desire to create consensus and legitimacy and thus foundations for a predictable development strategy.

In short, the government’s stated strategy was broadly reflective of interests shared by the leading business organizations. We shall now look into the practical strategy in somewhat greater detail. The analysis of the actual development strategy pursued by the Lula government will include macroeconomic policy, industrial policy, trade negotiations and trade policy, and, finally, social policy.

On the side of international trade negotiations, the Lula government has pursued a very affirmative line. In the case of the FTAA, the ambitious agenda pursued by the United States was shot down by Brazil and Mercosur as the negotiating positions of the US and Mercosur were strongly at odds. There was a view in the Brazilian government that no deal was better than a bad deal. The US was unwilling to negotiate agricultural trade related issues, where Brazil had offensive interests, in the FTAA arguing that this area should be discussed at the multilateral level in WTO negotiations. At the same time, the US wanted to negotiate in the industrial area and in the area of so-called “new issues”, i.e. government procurement, service sector and investment related issues, where the US had offensive interests. According to Samuel Pinheiro Guimarães (2006), a bad FTAA deal could have hurt Brazilian development seriously. 

In his inaugural speech, Lula emphasized the centrality of Mercosur and South America in Brazil’s foreign policy. However, trade relations were somewhat tense as Argentina pursued protectionist policies with the argument that the country needed to turn around the de-industrialization process that the country had experienced during the neo-liberal period. However, Brazilian exports to Argentina thrived and have grown substantially between 2003 and 2008 and the Brazilian government has held on to its rhetoric of presenting Mercosur as the most highly prioritized partner (Christensen, 2008). According to Vigevani and Haraldzini Jr. (2008: …), the strong emphasis of the business sector on Mercosur at the outset of Lula’s government has been weakened, and there is a tendency that business prioritizes a global agenda and does not want Argentina and Mercosur to get in the way of an autonomous global orientation of the Brazilian government. Souza (2008) confirms the falling priority attached to Mercosur by the Brazilian business sector. 

In WTO negotiations, Brazil and the other Mercosur countries have joined the G20 (Lima and Hirst, 2006), a coalition of developing countries that seeks to convince the EU and the US to liberalize their agricultural markets and drop export subsidies. The private sector follows WTO negotiations closely and seeks to influence the negotiating position of the Brazilian government. One important result of this, that shows the openness of the government’s negotiators, was achieved in a dispute over sugar. The leading organization in the sector, the Sugar Agribusiness Union of São Paulo, UNICA, argued that the EU was giving illegal subsidies to European sugar exporters hurting sugar exporters elsewhere. The Brazilian negotiators pursued the issue and in the end Brazil and the other countries that had joined Brazil in the complaint won the case (Análise, 2006: 54-55). 

In spite of these examples of the state closely defending the views of business, the area of trade and trade negotiations represents an area in which the government has put its autonomous imprint on the development strategy. This assertion is based on the strong rhetorical and practical emphasis given by the government to the strategic significance of economic relations with the developing countries. In a speech at the end of 2007, foreign minister Celso Amorim pointed out that 55 % of Brazil’s exports were by then going to the developing world (Amorim, 2007). As Vigevani and Cepaluni (2007) point out, the strong emphasis on economic relations with the developing world of the Lula government can be seen as part of a conscious strategy aimed at increasing national autonomy through the diversification of trade. This emphasis on the developing world was not part of the agenda proposed by CNI and Fiesp in 2002, and I believe that it marks a strategic and autonomous contribution by the Lula government to the overall development strategy. It is therefore also somewhat controversial. The same can be said about the South Amercan strategy of the government. 

The policy towards Mercosur and South America has been criticized by the political opposition and by commentators associated with business interests. The key to the criticism was summed up by Rubens Barbosa, who was Brazil’s ambassador to the United States during the Cardoso government. He criticized the foreign policy of the Lula government as overly ideological with its prioritization of South-South cooperation and its exaggerated generosity towards a number of South American governments on the political left (Argentina, Bolivia, Paraguay and Venezuela) and the relative neglect of Brazil’s traditional and most important partners, the EU and United States (Bacoccina, 2008). From this point of view, the foreign policy of the Lula government is not rational from the perspective of defending national development interests. This critical sense can also be traced in CNI which shares the view that there has not been enough focus on the most significant markets on the part of the government and that trade deals in South America such as the agreement between Mercosur and the Andes Block have not defended Brazilian interests sufficiently (Silva, 2007). The business sector has also been somewhat sceptical of Brazil’s association and close cooperation with the controversial Venezuelan president Hugo Chávez. The government disagrees with this view and emphasizes the strategic importance it places on South-South economic relations as well as political collaboration and argues that the reason that ambitious free trade agreements have not been reached with the EU and the United States can be explained by conflicting interests and the lack of flexibility on the part of the EU and the United States. Regardless of this, Brazilian exports to these trading partners has been growing strongly in the Lula years, although not as strongly as to the South. Although, the industrial sector may have some reservations regarding the foreign policy of the Lula government and the trade negotiation aspect of this policy, the CNI (Christensen, 2008) does stress that South America is strategically important to the Brazilian industrial sector as it absorbs a very large share of Brazilian industrial exports and since Brazilian foreign investment in the region has been growing steadily during Lula’s presidency, particularly in the areas of energy and infrastructural investments (Christensen, 2008).  

The macroeconomic policy pursued has been relatively orthodox with its emphasis on primary fiscal surpluses as a means to reduce the public debt/GDP ratio and an anti-inflationary monetary policy pursued together with an exchange rate regime of fluctuation. With this policy the government has been able to reduce the public debt/GDP ratio from approximately 55 % in 2002 to 42.8 % in 2007 as well as to assure a longer maturity profile on the debt and moving away from it being indexed to the US dollar to a significant extent (BCB, 2007: 80-84). Inflation was also kept under control and there was a significant improvement of the trade balance that gradually improved from a trade deficit during most of the Cardoso government that ended with a modest surplus to a record trade surplus in 2006 of 46.5 billion US$ that fell to US$ 40 billion in 2007 on the basis of a growth in exports from around US $ 60 billion in 2002 to 160 billion in 2007 (BCB, 2007: 107). Thus, the export performance of Brazil was excellent, although it was also helped along by a very positive external context of growth in the global economy and high commodity prices that led to a boost in Brazil’s export earnings from the primary sector.

The results of the industrial policy during the Lula government have been relatively good although not impressive. Annual real growth in the sector has been in between 3.5 and 4.0 % between 2003 and 2007 (BCB, 2006: 18; BCB, 2008: 19), while industrial exports have increased from US$ 50.7 billion in 2003 to 105.7 billion in 2007 (BCB, 2008: 114).  It could be seen as positive from the perspective of the development strategy’s emphasis on technological content and innovation in Brazilian exports that the leading branches of manufacturing exports are passenger airplanes and cars (BCB, 2008: 119) and that increases in industrial production in the period 2005 to 2007 has been particularly strong in the more advanced capital goods sector (BCB, 2008: 23). In any case, the contribution of exports in the most advanced technological segment is still quite modest (BCB, 2008: 121). Luciano Coutinho, who became the new president of the national development bank BNDES in 2007 argued in his inaugural speech (Coutinho, 2007) that the neglect of the industrial sector of the governments prior to Lula had weakened the industrial sector and not the least the more advanced segments of industry and stressed the importance of technologically advanced development for Brazil’s economic development. The choice of Coutinho as the new president of the bank meant a renewed impetus for long-term developing planning and an emphasis on the importance of the industrial sector for the overall economic development of the country.    

During the electoral campaign in 2002, Lula campaign on a platform of change. He criticized poorly conceived neo-liberal strategies during the preceding governments for having put Brazil’s sovereignty under pressure, having created economic stagnation and for having been unsuccessful in terms of reducing poverty and economic inequality. As a president, Lula from the very start emphasized the need to end hunger and to reduce poverty and economic inequality. This social agenda was to be a priority of his government, although improvements in this area needed to be made compatible with financing constraints and a determined stabilization policy aimed at reducing the public debt/GDP ratio. In this social agenda, successful economic growth and job creation were seen as the most significant elements along with increases in the minimum wage. Social spending policies were to have a complementary role and particularly target the poorest households. The government has had relative success in this area. Economic growth averaged an annual 3.4 % during Lula’s first presidency (BCB, 2008: 17). This growth rate is relatively modest, but it was achieved along with a reduction in external financial vulnerability and a gradual decline of the public debt/GDP ratio. Acknowledging that this growth rate was not completely satisfactory, the government made an acceleration of economic growth the main point in Lula’s re-election campaign in 2006 where he promised that in his second term the government would implement a programme of acceleration of economic growth, the PAC, in which large sums would be invested in public works in the area of infrastructure. This was to both contribute to economic growth and an improved competitiveness of the national economy that suffered from bottlenecks provoked by poor infrastructure. The CNI had also stressed this problem in a document put out in 2006 where it laid out its vision for Brazil’s development. The document was entitled “Growth. The Industry’s Vision” (2006), showing the emphasis of CNI on the need for Brazil to achieve a stronger economic growth performance. In spite of the relatively modest economic growth figures, Brazil in fact reached strong results in the social area through its multifaceted approach. Job creation was strong. During 2005 and 2006 more than 1.2 million formal jobs were created yearly in net terms. This figure was improved in 2007 where more than 1.6 million formal jobs were created in net terms (BCB, 2008: 35-36). The government had also pursued a policy of hiking the minimum wage and in the period 2003 to 2006 it rose some 26 % in real terms (FolhaOnline, 27-12-2006). The social agenda was also pursued as part of the production oriented agenda of the government in the government’s bio-diesel programme. The programme had several aims. It was to substitute imports of diesel by raising domestic production of bio-diesel through a planned expansion of the sector coordinated by the Agricultural Ministry involving participants from the agricultural sector and the energy sector. In its national plan for agriculturally based energy, all diesel sold in 2008 would have to have 2 % bio-diesel and this target was set to grow to 5 % by 2013. At the same time, the policy aimed at promoting production for bio-diesel on relatively poor family farms. Government subsidies and tax exemptions were to be used particularly generously in the poorest regions of the country in order to create jobs and income here (Agricultural Ministry, 2006: 78-85). Finally, in the area of redistributive social policies, the government implemented a cash transfer programme aimed at the poorest families with transfers conditioned on school attendance and vaccination given to the children in order to work towards the goals of social inclusion, improved education levels and health. The programme, Bolsa Familia or Family Subsidy, was extended to a vast parcel of the population with some 11.2 million families enrolled and a plan to enrol even more (Russo, 2009). These elements have led to a quite noteworthy reduction in the statistics of poverty and economic inequality. Thus, poverty has been reduced from 37.5 % of the population in 2001 to 30 % in 2007 while extreme poverty has been reduced from 13.2 % to 8.5 % (CEPAL, 2008: 94). With regard to economic inequality, it is still high but has been reduced. Statistics on income distribution show that between 2001 and 2007, the only group that had its share in total income reduced was the richest 10 % of the population while particularly the poorest 40 % had a significantly higher share in 2007 when compared to 2001 (CEPAL, 2008: 96).

The election results in 2006 show very strong results for Lula in the poorest states, while he lost in most of the richer states of the South and South-East, whereas he won all states but one in 2002. Lula received 60.8 % of the votes in the second turn in 2006 against 61.3 % in 2002 (Moraes, 2006). The difference in overall voter support was thus very small. This shows that Lula’s support amongst the poorest was particularly strong. Without doubt, this support can be explained by widespread confidence in Lula’s sincere intentions of reducing poverty and economic inequality. 

In contrast Lula lost in the states with strong middle classes, in spite of improvements in living standard. Probably, high income taxes and the corruption scandals the government had faced, particularly in 2005, explain the lower support for Lula in these states in 2006. 

Dissatisfaction was also rife in the leading industrial organizations, although their leaderships acknowledged improvements in Brazilian development during the first presidency of Lula. However, economic growth had been too low. Paulo Skaf, the president of Fiesp argued that this was to a very large extent a consequence of the overly stringent monetary policies implemented by the Central Bank. Brazilian real interest rates were very high. This had some very negative effects as it kept down economic growth at too low levels and meant that the public sector was paying astronomical amounts of interest payments on the public debt (Barros, 2006). CNI’s research director agreed arguing that it would be very difficult for Brazil to achieve the desired economic growth rate in 2007 due to a lack of productive investment and an unsatisfactory growth in domestic demand (Veríssimo, 2006). Paulo Nogueira Batista (2006), in alignment with the criticisms of the government’s policy aired by CNI and Fiesp, argued that it was time for economic growth now. In his view, the government should manage credit and the exchange rate in a more flexible way in order to achieve economic growth and in order to improve the capacity to redistribute income towards the poor. The policies of the Central Bank, in his view, favoured the financial lobby and hurt the rest of the economy. These views seemed to have some resonance amongst the government leadership. However, Central Bank president Henrique Meirelles defended the strict monetary policy with the argument that it kept inflation low and was an important reason why Lula had been re-elected as the low inflation figures helped defend the purchasing power of workers and thereby contributed to economic growth (Silva, 2006). Lula (2006) supported the position of Meirelles arguing that Brazil was successfully combining income distribution with macroeconomic equilibrium, had assured an improvement in the purchasing power of the minimum wage of 26 % while creating a more stable economy that was now ready for a new phase of accelerated economic growth. He further argued (Domingos, 2006) that he himself was responsible for the large primary fiscal surpluses and not former finance minister Palocci as some of the top people in the government had argued publicly creating nervousness in financial markets about a possible “populist” turn of the government in Lula’s second mandate. Whereas some of the leading figures in the government seemed to be favouring a more lax fiscal policy, the opposite position was defended by the CNI (2006) that found Brazilian taxes and government spending too high. In its opinion, this was partially responsible for the high interest rates in the economy and the low investment rates and therefore also the low economic growth rates. In this optic, the growing minimal wage was a problem because it contributed to the high government spending, due to the link between the minimum wage and different social transfers. The government, however, disagreed with this view and argued that this policy secured more economic equality and a higher domestic level of demand which supported the process of economic growth. In 2007, an economic growth level of 5.6 % was assured and the main driver of growth was in fact a dynamic development of domestic demand (BCB, 2008: Chapter 1). This shows that although the Lula government was embedding the state in the business sector, there were significant differences in view between the government and industry regarding the most desirable macroeconomic policy line. It also shows that the government’s line was particularly supported by poorer segments of society, although the election results show a very strong overall result for the Lula government, as well.

Recent Developments
The expansion of industrial sector activity continued at a high pace until the outbreak of the international financial crisis in the last months of 2008. Thus, industrial production in the first quarter of 2008 was 6.3 % higher than in the first quarter of 2007. Strong growth in domestic demand and 28 straight months of growing job creation in the sector meant that the growth of the industrial sector was at its highest level during the Lula government (Ávila and Mol, 2008: 24). At the same time, the government announced a new and expanded industrial policy, the Policy of Productive Development (PDP), in May 2008. The policy document emphasized the goals of expanding industrial production and innovation. However, the document was very elaborate and ambitious in terms of the overall goals. It set goals for productive investments, research and development of private business, the Brazilian share of global exports and the contribution of small exporters to the overall exports for the period until 2010. For instance, Brazil’s share of global exports was to increase to 1.25 % from the 1.16 % reached in 2007, which, by the way, shows that Brazil’s weight in global exports had performed quite well during the Lula government. Whereas only a few sectors had been singled out in the PITCE document in 2003, the new PDP singled out 25 sectors that were divided into three categories. Strategic areas were one of the sectors, areas where Brazilian global leadership should be consolidated was the second category, and the last category was sectors where Brazil’s competitiveness should be strengthened (Pinto and Gazir, 2008: 25-26). The document furthermore specified which actions should be taken and which organizations (mostly the Ministry of Development, Industry and International Trade) had main responsibility for which actions. The different programmes were to be followed and reports were to be written and presented to the Industrial Development Council CNDI. CNI’s executive director, José Augusto Fernandes was positive about the initiative and argued that the set-up of dialogue mechanisms between government and business would stimulate the self-organization of different business sectors and that those organized would have a possibility to be included. However, CNI president Armando Monteiro Neto pointed out that CNDI had not held any meetings during the last one and a half years, although he did acknowledge that the Lula government had been more open to dialogue with the private sector than the government of Cardoso. Echoing this concern, Fiesp president Paulo Skaf argued that there was a need for more participation on the part of the productive sector in the formulation of policies although he did acknowledge that the government in its planning of the PDP had listened to the suggestions of business and that the plans of reducing taxation on business contained in the PDP seemed a good step (Pinto and Gazir, 2008: 26-27). 

The PDP document shows the strong belief of the government in long-term development planning and in the role of the state as coordinator, in collaboration with business, of the growth process. It also shows a continued strife for international competitiveness of the Brazilian economy and for its transformation in an ever more productive and efficient direction. At the same time, the relationship between government and business seems to have been one of the embedded autonomy of the state. In terms of actual development results, the Lula government seemed to have been quite successful during the period between 2003 and 2008 prior to the international financial and development crisis that broke out in late 2008. 

The leading business organizations have reacted to the crisis by continuing pressuring the government to implement tax reforms and labour market reforms that will reduce production costs and to reduce government spending and interest rates in the economy in order to create a better climate for productive investments. The financial and development crisis has had a negative impact on Brazil’s economic growth but will not be treated further in the present analysis. 

Conclusion
Brazil’s development strategy during the presidency of Lula has been a mixture of continuity with the strategies of former governments and of changes of orientation. The government has maintained a policy of economic openness without going back to the protectionist approach from the period between 1930 and 1990. It has also maintained strict macro-economic policies in the area of fiscal policy and monetary policy in order to stabilize the economy. This has led some analysts to argue that the Lula government has maintained the neo-liberal development strategy of the 1990s. 

This is not completely correct, however. A very important change in strategy has been the emphasis on state activism and long-term development planning aimed at promoting productive transformation and the creation of new competitive economic sectors helped along by state action in the area of industrial policy and international trade policy. This new emphasis on state activism as a way to promote international competitiveness and productive transformation differs from a more passive strategy of openness in the 1990s. 

This strategy has been shaped through dialogue and cooperation between the business sector and the state. It can thus be argued that one can speak of a coalition between state and business in a situation where the government is run by a president associated with labour. New institutionalized channels for state-business dialogue have been created and business has been very active in terms of organizing itself and promoting its own development agenda, e.g. through policy papers shared with the public and the state. The development agenda of the government overall has been business friendly, and leading business organizations Fiesp and CNI have been relatively pleased with the greater state-business dialogue promoted by the Lula government in comparison to the former governments and with the greater emphasis on active industrial policies, although business has disagreed with some of the policies pursued by the government, particularly the macroeconomic policies. The leading business organizations believe that the fiscal policy of the Lula government is not strict enough leading to an overly high tax level and overspending on the part of the public sector, while the monetary policy is too strict and provokes overly high interest rates that depress investments and economic activity. Apart from this business has been somewhat at odds with the trade policy of the governments that has been criticized for being somewhat ideological and favouring collaboration with developing countries and South American governments with ideological (leftist) affinities to the PT government, while somewhat neglecting relations with Brazil’s traditional trade partners the US and the EU. Business, therefore, would like more real influence on development policy, but they do acknowledge that the Lula government is willing to listen to them and that it has achieved relative success in terms of stabilizing the economy and entering a period of renewed economic growth, although it believes that better policies would assure more economic growth. The government’s strict monetary policies should, however, be understood in the context of Brazil’s difficulties at assuring a good access to international capital markets between 1980 and 2002. The government has had success in assuring a better access to capital markets and at reducing external vulnerability that had been very constraining during the 1990s. Successful export promotion policies amongst other things have helped in this area. Overall the relatively business friendly policy environment during the Lula government associated with its autonomous strategy formulation shows that Brazil can be considered a developmental state characterized by the embedded autonomy of the state.

Why has this overall development strategy been chosen instead of a more protectionist and populist policy? The reasoning should be found in the structural characteristics of the Brazilian economy and the situation Brazil found itself in at the beginning of the Lula government. Brazil is a quite diversified economy with an intermediate level of industrial development, and the combination of macroeconomic strictness with an activist industrial and international trade negotiation policy of the Brazilian state has been a way in which the government has sought to combine stabilization of the economy, with lower external vulnerability and a reduction in the public debt/GDP ratio with productive transformation, increasing exports and job formation in an attempt to improve the overall competitiveness of the economy as a way to improve broad living standards in a way that would not provoke unstable cycles of high and low growth but instead assure the foundation for long-term sustainable development. Seen in this light, the government has achieved relatively good development results when measured against the heavy constraints it was faced with from the start of its mandate. On the other hand, more could be done in promoting the successful development of more advanced industrial sectors. Also, the current international financial crisis poses new challenges for the government.

Lastly, it most be noted that the Lula government has achieved to introduce an approach that comes close to the ideal type of a developmental state with embedded autonomy in the context of a democratic political system. And, although critics on the political left have criticized the government for the opposite of the criticism from business, namely criticizing it for an overly strict fiscal policy and more generally an economic policy that favours the financial sector and economic elites and therefore does not promote a more fundamental structural transformation of Brazilian society, it is a fact that the government and not the least the president himself enjoys very strong popular backing, particularly from the poorest regions and social strata in society. The reduction of poverty and economic equality and not the least the Bolsa Familia programme have earned the government a reputation for being on the side of the poor, in spite of fiscal strictness. It can be argued that the state is therefore not just embedded in the business sector and enjoys a reasonable degree of autonomy from it but that it is actually embedded more broadly in Brazilian society. This can be seen as a major success on the part of the Lula government and it bodes well for future political stability and for the stability of Brazilian democracy.
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^1	  Paper presented at the conference “New Thinking on Citizenship, Power and Public Space in Latin  America” on June 3-4, 2009 in Roskilde, Denmark.  Author: Steen Fryba Christensen. E-mail: sfc@hum.aau.dk
^2	  CNI is the national umbrella organization on top of the system of the industrial state federations. 
^3	  The concept refers to Brazilian political and business elites as well as leading intellectuals who participate in the debates on Brazil’s foreign policy orientation. Souza himself (2002: 15) defines the concept at the “universe constituted by people who participate in the decision process and/or contribute in a relevant way in the formation of opinions regarding the international relations of the country” (my translation).
